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LEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge: 
Pro se Plaintiff Mandela Brock (“Plaintiff” or “Brock”) filed this action on September 14, 
2020 against Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”), Mark Zuckerberg (“Zuckerberg”), Sheryl Sandberg 
(“Sandberg”), and John and Jane Does 1-100 (collectively, “Defendants”).  By amended 
complaint, Plaintiff added Sean Parker (“Parker”) and Mark Pincus (“Pincus”) as Defendants.  
Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his constitutional rights to free speech and due process by 
allegedly removing and blocking his Facebook posts.  Plaintiff also alleges a series of civil 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) violations. 
Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) 
on the grounds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief.  Alternatively, 
Defendants move to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  
For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion to dismiss with prejudice.  It also 
denies the motion to transfer as moot. 
6/25/2021 
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BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Mandela Brock brought this action against Facebook, Zuckerberg, Sandberg and 
later Parker for “unconstitutionally censor[ing]” his content on the Facebook platform.1  Dkt. No. 
2 (“Compl.”) ¶ 4.  
Facebook is a California-based technology company that operates a variety of online 
services and applications, including its flagship “Facebook” social media platform.  Dkt. No. 29 
at 12.  Mark Zuckerberg serves as Chief Executive Officer of Facebook and Sheryl Sandberg 
serves as Chief Operating Officer.2  Id.  On the Facebook platform, individuals can upload 
content, share posts, create groups, and comment on other posts.  See Compl., Ex. A-1, A-2.  
According to Defendants, all persons who use Facebook must agree to Facebook’s User 
Agreement.  Dkt. No. 28 at 1 (the “Agreement”).  The Agreement includes Facebook’s “Terms 
of Use,” “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,” and “Terms of Service.”  Id.  Facebook’s 
Terms of Service, Dkt. No. 18-1, prohibit users from “shar[ing] anything: [t]hat violates . . . our 
Community Standards . . . [t]hat is unlawful, misleading, discriminatory or fraudulent.”  Dkt. No. 
18-1 at 4.  Plaintiff is registered to use Facebook under the username “Mandela El’Shabazz.”  
Compl., Ex. A.3 
Plaintiff claims Facebook “censored” his content on its platform at least thirty times 
between March 2020 and September 2020.  Dkt. No. 21 (“Amended Complaint” or “AC”) ¶ 4.  
He alleges that Facebook first “censored” his posts on or around March 15, 2020 and that 
Facebook’s removal of his posts “intensified” following the George Floyd protests in May 2020.  
 
1 Zuckerberg, Sandberg, and Parker are referred to as the “Individual Defendants.” 
2 While Parker was named as a Defendant in the Amended Complaint, no summons has been 
issued against him. 
3 The Plaintiff did not include all relevant claims or Exhibits A, C, D, F, K or M in the Amended 
Complaint.  However, in accordance with the Court’s obligation to construe pro se pleadings 
liberally, the Court considers both the original complaint and the amended complaint together.  
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Id. ¶ 5.  Plaintiff’s posts were flagged and removed by Facebook for violating the company’s 
“Community Standards” on spam, Compl., Exs. A, C, and F, and its “Community Standards” on 
hate speech, Compl., Exs. A, C, D, K, and M.  Plaintiff’s posts were also flagged for being 
“abusive,” Compl., Ex. L, and for being “partly false,” Compl., Exs. R and Q. 
In response to Facebook’s removal and flagging of his content, Plaintiff alleges violations 
of his constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  Compl. 
¶¶ 16-20, 21-26; AC ¶¶ 23-27, 28-33.  Plaintiff claims Facebook, Zuckerberg, and Sandberg 
violated Plaintiff’s “right to free speech” by allowing the “Facebook Oversight Board,”4 which 
he presumes is responsible for ensuring user compliance with Facebook’s Community Standards, 
to “censor” his content.  Compl. ¶¶ 17-18; AC ¶¶ 24-25.  Plaintiff then alleges Defendants 
violated his “due process” rights by failing to provide him with an opportunity to “put forward a 
stated . . .  defense” for his posts.  Compl. ¶ 17; AC ¶ 24.  Plaintiff also claims that Zuckerberg, 
Sandberg, and Parker “permitted, tolerated, and w[ere] deliberately indifferent to a clear pattern 
of suppression of free speech, discrimination, and partisanship abuse.”  Compl. ¶ 22; AC ¶ 29. 
Plaintiff also alleges Facebook and the Individual Defendants violated RICO.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962; AC ¶¶ 34-71.  Plaintiff’s RICO claims primarily relate to Defendants’ motion to transfer 
the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, pursuant to the 
forum selection clause in Facebook’s Terms of Service.  AC ¶¶ 20-22.  Plaintiff alleges 
Defendants—in seeking to enforce the forum selection clause—are operating a “jurisdictional 
shell game.”  Id. ¶ 11.   
 
4 Plaintiff defines the Facebook Oversight Board in the Amended Complaint John Doe 1-100 and 
Jane Doe 1-100. 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed an initial complaint against Facebook, Zuckerberg, 
Sandberg, and John Doe 1-100 and Jane Doe 1-100.5  Compl. at 3.  Defendants moved to dismiss 
the initial complaint, or alternatively to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) on November 20, 2020.  Dkt. No. 
17. 
Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on December 16, 2020.  Pursuant to the Court’s 
individual practices, Defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied as moot.  Dkt. No. 26.  In the 
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added Defendants Parker (in his personal and corporate 
capacities) and Pincus.  Pincus is the litigation attorney who appeared for Facebook, Zuckerberg, 
and Sandberg in this case.  Id.  On December 30, 2020, the Court dismissed the claims against 
Pincus as frivolous.  Dkt. No. 26.  Plaintiff appealed the Court’s decision to dismiss the claims 
against Pincus.  Dkt. No. 30.  The Second Circuit dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 on June 3, 2021.  Dkt. No. 36.  Pincus, on behalf of Zuckerberg, Sandberg, and 
Facebook, filed a new motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or alternatively, to transfer 
venue on January 11, 2021.  Dkt. No. 29.  Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss on 
February 28, 2021.  Dkt. No. 30.  On March 8, 2021, Defendants filed a reply memorandum of 
law in further support of their motion to dismiss.  Dkt. No. 34.   
LEGAL STANDARD 
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “accept the 
material facts as alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff’s favor.”  Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Hernandez v. 
 
5 Plaintiff does not make any substantive allegations against John Doe 1-100 or Jane Doe 1-100. 
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Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994)).  However, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  The Court is obligated to construe pro se pleadings 
broadly and liberally, interpreting them so as to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.  See 
Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007); Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 
2000).  
However, while the Court construes pro se pleadings liberally, this does not relieve pro se 
plaintiffs of the requirement that they plead enough facts to “nudg[e] their claims across the line 
from conceivable to plausible.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  Nor does it relieve them of the 
obligation to otherwise comply with the pleading standards set forth by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  See Saidin v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 498 F. Supp. 2d 683, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
see also Locicero v. O’Connell, 419 F. Supp. 2d 521, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (requiring that pro se 
litigants allege sufficient facts to indicate deprivation of a constitutional right).  
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff alleges Facebook’s removal and blocking of his posts violated both his 
constitutional rights and various “New York State” claims.  AC ¶¶ 23-27, 28-33; Dkt. No. 33 
¶¶ 28-29.  The Court construes the Complaint as primarily alleging claims under the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
Plaintiff also alleges Defendants’ motion to transfer constituted “racketeering activity” and 
violated several federal statutes.  AC ¶¶ 34-71.  The Court addresses these claims in turn.  
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I. Claims Related to Alleged Removal of Content  
A. Claims Under the First Amendment 
 Claims Against Facebook 
“Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private 
parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish 
that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.”  Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 206 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass' n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005)); see 
also Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free 
speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government.”); Rodriguez v. Winski, 973 F. 
Supp. 2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“It is axiomatic that the First Amendment protects the rights 
to speak, publish, and assemble against abridgement only by the government.”).   
  The actions of a private corporation only constitute state action “(i) when the private 
entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function; (ii) when the government compels the 
private entity to take a particular action or (iii) when the government acts jointly with the private 
entity.”  Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  Notably, “merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, 
exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state actors subject to 
First Amendment constraints.”  Id. at 1930.  Therefore, private companies which maintain public 
online forums may “exercise editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in [such] 
forum[s].”  Id.  
Though the Second Circuit has not addressed the question of whether a social media 
provider is a state actor for First Amendment purposes, other circuits that have confronted the 
issue have unanimously held platforms like Facebook are not state actors.  For example, the D.C. 
Circuit recently held that Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Apple were not state actors; the court 
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then affirmed the dismissal of First Amendment claims against the companies.  Freedom Watch, 
Inc. v. Google Inc., 816 F. App’x 497, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting the mere provision of “an 
important forum for speech” did not transform online platforms into state actors).  In a similar 
case involving YouTube, the Ninth Circuit held that “the state action doctrine preclude[d] 
constitutional scrutiny of YouTube’s content moderation pursuant to its Terms of Service and 
Community Guidelines.”  Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020).  
Other courts throughout the country have also declined to treat Facebook as a state actor and 
have upheld the company’s ability to remove content.  See, e.g., Ebeid v. Facebook, Inc., 2019 
WL 2059662 at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2019); Zimmerman v. Facebook, Inc., 2020 WL 5877863 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2020). 
Plaintiff’s claims based on the First Amendment, as well as on the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, therefore fail at the threshold because Facebook is not a state actor.  
Plaintiff contends that Facebook’s status as a “state actor” is “immaterial” because Facebook is 
performing a function “traditionally” performed by the government.  Dkt. No. 33 ¶¶ 8-12.  The 
relevant function that Facebook provides is an online platform for speech.  Plaintiff also 
analogizes Facebook’s provision of an online messaging service to the government’s traditional 
provision of mail services through the United States Postal Service.  Id. ¶¶ 10-11.  However, “[i]t 
is ‘not enough’ that the relevant function is something that a government has ‘exercised . . . in 
the past, or still does’ or ‘that the function serves the public good.’”  Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 
998 (quoting Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928-29).  The government must have performed the 
function in question exclusively as well.  Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1929.  Facilitating the exchange 
of communication or hosting a platform for discussion are not activities “that only governmental 
entities have traditionally performed.”  Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 998 (quoting Halleck, 139 S. 
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Ct. at 1930).  Thus, Plaintiff may not “avoid the state action question” by claiming that Facebook 
is serving a public function.  Id. at 999.   
Plaintiff’s other arguments regarding Facebook’s status as a “new town square,” Dkt. No. 
33 ¶ 12, have been similarly addressed and dismissed by other courts.  See e.g., Zimmerman, 
2020 WL 5877863, at *2 (holding the operation of a “digital town square” did not make 
Facebook a state actor).  The Supreme Court held in Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 
506 (1946) that citizens in a company-owned town were guaranteed constitutional protections 
against the deprivation of their First Amendment rights by the company, but courts have refused 
to extend Marsh’s holding to social media cases.  See, e.g., Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 998 
(noting Marsh was “unequivocally confined . . .  to the unique and rare context of company 
town[s] and other situations where the private actor perform[s] the full spectrum of municipal 
powers”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Finally, Facebook’s status as a 
publicly held company does not make the company a state actor for the purposes of 
constitutional violations.  See Freedom Watch, 816 F. App’x at 499 (dismissing First 
Amendment claims against Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Apple, which are all publicly traded 
companies).  
 Claims Against Individual Defendants 
Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts about Zuckerberg or Sandberg’s personal 
involvement which would “nudg[e] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  Plaintiff claims that the Individual Defendants “permitted, tolerated, 
and [sic] were deliberately indifferent to a clear pattern of suppression of free speech, 
discrimination, and partisanship abuse.” Compl. at 6.  However, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts 
that connect Zuckerberg or Sandberg to Facebook’s removal of his posts.  In the absence of any 
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allegations connecting Zuckerberg or Sandberg to Plaintiff’s claims, the Amended Complaint 
must be dismissed. 
B. Claims Under the Communications Decency Act 
 Claims Against Facebook 
The Court construes Plaintiff’s unspecified “New York State” claims as primarily 
alleging violations of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).  Under Section 
230(c)(1) of the CDA, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  The aim of Section 230(c)(1) is to “provide immunity for 
‘interactive computer service[s]’ that make ‘good faith’ efforts to block and screen offensive 
content.”  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016).  “In 
light of Congress’s objectives, the Circuits are in general agreement that the text of Section 
230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor of immunity.”  Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 
53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019). 
A defendant will not be liable for removing certain content if it is “(1) a provider or user 
of an interactive computer service, (2) the claim is based on information provided by another 
information content provider and (3) the claim would treat [the defendant] as the publisher or 
speaker of that information.”  LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 173 (quoting Universal Commc’n 
Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007)).  
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to make out a claim against Facebook under Section 230(c)(1).  
First, Facebook’s online platform has routinely been classified as an “interactive computer 
service.”  Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 156 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); see also, id. 
(“The Second Circuit has not considered whether social media platforms in particular are 
‘interactive computer services’ within the meaning of the law; however, other courts have readily 
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concluded that such websites (and Facebook in particular) fall into this category.”).  Second, 
Plaintiff does not allege that Facebook or the Individual Defendants “provided” the information 
that led to the claim.  Rather, Plaintiff’s claims are based on Facebook’s alleged removal of 
content he personally created or shared.  Compl. ¶¶ 17-18; AC ¶¶ 24-25; see LeadClick Media, 
LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasizing a defendant “will not be held responsible 
unless it assisted in the development of what made the content unlawful”).  Third, Section 
230(c)(1) “bars lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's 
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content.”  Id.; see also Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) 
(upholding Vimeo’s immunity under Section 230(c)(1) to filter or remove content which violated 
its content and community policies).  Facebook is therefore immune under Section 230(c)(1) 
from claims related to its removal of objectionable content.   
 Claims Against Individual Defendants 
Plaintiff also claims that Zuckerberg, in his individual capacity, cannot claim immunity 
under Section 230(c)(1) because he is “responsible for hiring the ‘Fact Checking Service’ that 
checks the veracity of reposts and then publishes the ‘corrected’ content.”  Dkt. No. 33 ¶¶ 26-27. 
Presumably, Plaintiff is asserting that Zuckerberg is in some way an “information content 
provider” and thus not immune from liability.  Similarly, Plaintiff claims Sandberg is not 
immune under Section 230(c)(1) because she is “the ‘direct manger’ of the ‘content’ that is fact 
checked and then published with the correction.”  Id. ¶ 29.  However, here again Plaintiff fails to 
plead facts which support a “plausible” connection between the Individual Defendants and 
Facebook’s alleged removal of his content.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  
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II. Claims Related to RICO Violations 
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges Defendants violated the following federal 
statutes, which may serve as predicate RICO offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1): 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (relating to the obstruction of state or local law 
enforcement), and 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or 
extortion).  AC ¶¶ 34-43, 54-63, 64-67.  In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff also 
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (relating to wire fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (relating 
to obstruction of justice).  Dkt. No. 33 ¶¶ 37-47; 40.  Though not defined as “racketeering 
activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), Plaintiff also alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (fraud 
and related activity in connection with access devices) and general violations of 18 U.S.C. § 
1962(a). AC ¶¶ 50-53, 68-71. 
“To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) a violation of the RICO statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 1962; (2) an injury to business or property; and (3) that the injury was caused by the 
violation of Section 1962.”  Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, 720 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir. 2001)).  To demonstrate a violation of 
the RICO statute, a plaintiff must show “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern 
(4) of racketeering activity.”  Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).  Predicate 
offenses which constitute “racketeering activity” are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).  “A ‘pattern 
of racketeering activity’ is defined by the statute as ‘at least two acts of racketeering activity’ 
within a ten-year period.”  Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1691(5)).  
“Litigation activity alone cannot constitute a viable RICO predicate act.”  Id. at 105.  The 
majority of Plaintiff’s RICO claims stems from Defendants’ efforts to enforce Facebook’s forum 
selection clause.  See e.g., AC ¶ 38 (alleging Defendants are “attempting to ‘defraud’ the court 
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by ‘swindling’ the court . . . into transferring this matter to a venue that is not proper”); id. ¶ 55 
(claiming Defendants are “obfuscating justice” by organizing under the laws of one state and 
conducting business in other states); id. ¶ 65 (contending Defendants are engaged in a 
“duplicitous playing of the jurisdictional shell game”).  Plaintiff’s claims, which stem from the 
Defendants’ motion to transfer the action pursuant to Facebook’s Terms of Service, must fail 
because they arise purely out of a litigation action.  See Kim, 884 F.3d at 105.  Thus, the 
following claims, which the Court construes as based primarily on Facebook’s motion to transfer 
the action, must fail: 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (relating to the 
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (relating to interference with 
commerce, robbery, or extortion), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (relating to wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) 
(relating to obstruction of justice), and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). 
Finally, Plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (fraud and related 
activity in connection with access devices) fail as a matter of law as Plaintiff did not allege any 
facts which suggest Facebook used “access devices” in an unauthorized manner.  18 U.S.C. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Defendants’ motion, in the alternative, to transfer the venue to the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is DENIED as such a 
transfer would not be necessary or a beneficial use of judicial resources. 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED in accordance 
with this opinion and order.  
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close Dkt. No. 27 and to close the case. 
 SO ORDERED. 
  
 
Dated: June 25, 2021          __________________________________ 
 New York, New York        LEWIS J. LIMAN 
              United States District Judge  
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